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The police pursuit technique has only recently come under
scrutiny. Recent concern and publicity have forced the law enforce-
ment community to respond with appropriate guidelines for officers
to follow.1 As with any police technique about which little is known,
solutions are often suggested without proper analysis or informa-
tion. Armchair philosophy and conventional wisdom can aid in de-
ciding which of several responses to a problem is the best one, but
solving the problem of police pursuit requires decision-making
rather than problem-solving skills. Thus, appropriate knowledge
must be obtained and processed before proper decisions can be
made. Moreover, after the appropriate data are analyzed, any inter-
pretation is subject to judgments that must be balanced before pol-
icy makers consider the alternatives. 2 It is therefore important to
* Appreciation is expressed to Chief Dale Bowlin, Metro-Dade Police Department
and ProfessorsJames F. Short and Charles Wellford for their comments on earlier drafts
of this manuscript. Support for this study was made possible by the Metro-Dade Police
Department and the United States Department of Transportation. The opinions and
conclusions reported herein reflect only those of the authors.
* * Professor, College of Criminal Justice and Research Professor, Institute of Public
Affairs, University of South Carolina.
Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Miami.
1 Alpert, Police Pursuit Linking Data to Decisions, 24 CraM. L. BULL. 453 (1988); Al-
pert, Questioning Police Pursuits in Urban Areas, 15J. OF POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 298 (1987)
[hereinafter Questioning Police Pursuits]; Alpert & Anderson, The Most Deadly Force: Police
Pursuits, 3JusT. Q. 1 (1986).
2 Petersilia, The Influence of Research on Policing, in CRTICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 230
(1989).
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consider the information necessary to ensure appropriate pursuit
driving and the reduction of accident and injury.
3
This study identifies the salient factors that influence the out-
come of pursuit driving. The identification of factors that predict
the appropriateness of specific police pursuits requires an interac-
tional analysis due to its complexity. The analysis must include a
consideration of the behaviors of at least three actors: the police
officer, the law violator, and innocent third parties. Consequently,
this complexity creates uncertainties or unpredictable contingen-
cies, both of which affect outcomes.
II. A STRATEGIC ANALOGY AND THE USE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH
One of the more publicized areas of police worik that has only
recently become a target of research is response to calls for domes-
tic violence. Until the mid- 1980s, police were reluctant to make ar-
rests for domestic violence without the presence of extenuating
circumstances. 4 The police most frequently resolved the disputes
using alternatives: negotiation and referral, threatening the dispu-
tants, leaving, or removing one of the disputants from the prem-
ises. 5 Arrests were made only under special circumstances, 6 and,
unfortunately, the police used no empirical data to make these
decisions.
To inform the decision-makers, Sherman and Berk7 conducted
and reported the results of an experiment in which they concluded
that recidivism was lower for those arrested than for any other
method of resolution. They concluded further that the police
should make an arrest unless there are clear reasons that an arrest
would be counterproductive. These conclusions contradict histori-
cal wisdom and challenge present police practices in many jurisdic-
tions. Even though Sherman and Berk acknowledge the limitations
of their data and findings and welcome replications of their research
to test external validity and generalizability,8 this example suggests
that, when possible, empirical research may prove valuable in devel-
oping police policies.
Police pursuit lends itself to empirical research and examina-
3 Questioning Police Pursuits, supra note 1, at 300-01.
4 Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assaults, 49 AM.
Soc. REV. 261, 270 (1984).
5 Id. at 272.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Langan & Innes, Preventing Domestic Violence Against Women, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 4 (Aug. 1986).
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tion. The conventional understanding of police pursuit derives
from the impressions provided by Hollywood and sensational news
reports. Although most pursuits do not resemble these dramatic
events, they nevertheless create high anxiety and the potential for
destruction and injury. An ideal study of pursuit would include ex-
periments that control the discretionary decisions made by police.
The random assignment of officers permitted to pursue and not per-
mitted to pursue, under a variety of conditions, would serve as a
valuable research design, by permitting the evaluation of pursuit
driving and the differential deterrent effect on those offenders who
are pursued and those who are not pursued. Because such experi-
mentation may never be permitted, this study is limited to evalua-
tions that compare police officers and pursuit characteristics with
chase outcomes for the purpose of improving police policies and
practices. The data presented in this study provide a comprehen-
sive look at police pursuit by analyzing the findings from more than
300 pursuits that took place in Dade County, Florida during 1987.
First, however, is a discussion of pursuit as a discretionary police
practice and a review of findings from prior research.
III. DISCRETION AND PURSUIT
Police officers are street-level bureaucrats charged with protect-
ing lives by enforcing the law. A topic of significant debate and re-
:search is the extent to which police officers enforce the law, against
whom, on what occasions, and by what tactics. 9 A trickle-up-practice
sometimes influences police officers' behavioral choices: officers
may act in a variety of ways when only vague guidelines exist with-
out strong policies and supervision. If administrators do not pro-
hibit certain behavior, the officers might perceive the behavior as
appropriate. The behavior would thereby become acceptable and
customary. As Mark Blumberg reports, "the research suggests not
only that a tightened policy which is rigorously enforced will reduce
the number of shootings, but that it will change their nature as
well."' 0 Research has informed us that police discretion, both indi-
vidual and organizational, can be controlled before unwanted pat-
terns of behavior develop." Police policies regarding pursuit
9 Weber-Brooks, Police Discretionary Behavior: A Study of Style, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
POLICING 121, 126-140 (1989).
10 Blumberg, Controlling Police Use of Deadly Force: Assessing Two Decades of Progress, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 450 (1989); see generally Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on
Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 309, 315 (1979).
11 Weber-Brooks, supra note 9, at 121-24; M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE
DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 276 (1981).
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generally fall under one of three models:' 2 1)Judgmental-allowing
officers to make all major decisions relating to initiation, tactics, and
termination; 2) Restrictive-placing certain restrictions on officers'
judgments and decisions; and 3) Discouragement-severely cautioning
or discouraging any pursuit, except in the most extreme situations.
Police departments, operating under regulations that empha-
size judgmental decision making, provide only guidelines for their
officers. Usually, these warnings require officers to weigh various
factors before initiating a pursuit, to consider their safety and the
safety of others during a pursuit, and to terminate a chase when it
becomes too risky. The vagueness of this type of regulation permits
officers to make most of the decisions and therefore requires the
most supervision, control, and training.'
3
Departments that operate under restrictive regulations or spe-
cific rules limit individual officers' discretion. For example, orders
may restrict officers from initiating pursuits when the law violators
are juveniles, traffic offenders, or property offenders. Similarly, in-
pursuit driving behavior may be so limited by ordering specific
speed, distance, or time limitations. Additionally, a rule may restrict
some types of driving such as going the wrong way on a one-way
street, driving over curbs or driving on private property.
Discouragement policies only allow pursuit driving under spe-
cific conditions. Examples include chasing a known murder suspect
or a suspect whom an officer has observed committing a violent
crime. These policies are very specific and leave little room for
discretion.
Ultimately, determining the appropriate policies and proce-
dures that balance deterrence and citizen safety is the key element in
obtaining the desired police reaction to motorists who refuse to re-
spond to emergency signals.
IV. PRIOR RESEARCH ON POLICE PURSUIT
Only recently has empirical research on police pursuit been
conducted. 14 Gaining access to police information is a major obsta-
cle to this type of police research and few departments have ever
collected and analyzed their own data on pursuit driving. The
United States Department of Transportation sponsored the first
12 E. FENNESSY, T. HAMILTON, K. JOSCELYN & J. MERRITT, A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM
OF HOT PURSUIT BY THE POLICE XV (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway Safety Bureau
1970).
13 Id.
14 Questioning Police Pursuits, supra note 1, at 299; Alpert & Dunham, Research on Police
Pursuits: Applications for Law Enforcement, 7 AM. J. OF POLICE 124 (1988).
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complete study on pursuit driving.15 This important study summa-
rized previous research on pursuit driving and characterized it as
being "distinguished primarily by the absence of any work of quanti-
tative substance."'
16
These researchers acknowledged that pursuit driving was a con-
troversial topic involving the broader issue of effective law enforce-
ment and reported the existence of two opposing schools of
thought. First, the law enforcement viewpoint considered pursuit
driving as a vital aspect of deterrence for both traffic supervision
and crime control. The argument advanced by this school was that
chaos would result on the streets if police were either forbidden to
engage in pursuit or unduly restricted. This view emphasized crime
control and deterrence.' 7 Second, a group comprised mainly of
physicians reasoned that pursuit driving resulted in an unacceptable
number of casualties. This view emphasized citizens' safety, even at
the expense of crime control and deterrence. This group further
believed that pursuit driving was too dangerous and human life too
valuable to place it at such a high level of risk.' s The primary reason
for the difference between the two schools of thought is a nearly
complete lack of reliable data on the nature of pursuit driving.
In their report, Fennessy, Hamilton, Joscelyn and Merritt
presented a discussion balancing the ideas argued by both
schools.' 9 The report identified appropriate methods by which re-
searchers could conduct a test to determine if support for either po-
sition was warranted and suggested that the reduction of crashes,
injuries, and deaths is the main goal of any meaningful policy or
practice.20 It was not until the 1980s, however, that any empirical
research was conducted on pursuit driving, although many individ-
ual police agencies and professional associations recognized the
need for investigation and improvements in police pursuit policies
and practices.2 1
The early 1980s marked the second generation of research on
police pursuits. The California Highway Patrol (CHP), responding
to pleas from the decade before, conducted an exploratory study on
police pursuit.22 Although limited to a six month period, and sub-
stantially limited to freeways, the study followed many of the sug-
15 E. FENNESSY, supra note 12, at x.
16 Id. at 151.
17 Id. at 10-11.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 46-50.
20 Id. at 127-30.
21 California Highway Patrol, Pursuit Study, in STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1-3 (1983).
22 Id.
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gestions made by the Fennessy group 23 and thereby provides an
excellent base of information. The CHP study reports findings from
an analysis of almost 700 pursuits. The profile based upon results
from this study shows that the typical pursuit: 1) is initiated by a
traffic violation; 2) takes place at night; 3) continues for one mile; 4)
lasts one to two minutes; 5) involves two police cars; 6) is termi-
nated voluntarily by the offender; and 7) involves a male driver
twenty years old.24 Two of the most important findings reported by
the CHP are that: 1) 77% of the suspects were apprehended; and 2)
70% of the pursuits ended without an accident.
25
Based upon its empirical analysis, the CHP concluded that pur-
suit is worth the risk:
Attempted apprehension of motorists in violation of what appear to be
minor traffic infractions is necessary for the preservation of order on
the highways of California. If approximately 700 people will attempt
to flee from the officers who participated in this six-month study,
knowing full well that the officers would give chase, one can imagine
what would happen if the police suddenly banned pursuits. Undoubt-
edly, innocent people may be injured or killed because an officer
chooses to pursue a suspect, but this risk is necessary to avoid the even
greater loss that would occur if law enforcement agencies were not
allowed to aggressively pursue violators.
26
Not all police administrators, policy makers, or politicians will agree
with the conclusions drawn by the CHP study. Certainly, though,
citizens reading about the damage, injuries, and deaths that result
from police pursuits will be concerned.
The data reported by the CHP add empirical support to some
of the suggestions made by the Fennessy group, 27 which observed in
1970 that pursuits do not typically end in injury or death as both the
media and police literature often imply. The 1970 study recom-
mended the outcome of the pursuit as the best measure of its risk. 28
Policy and rule-making decisions about pursuits depend, in part, on
these risks. While other measures are important, it is the outcome of
a pursuit that most concerns the parties involved. The research
presented here focuses upon pursuits and provides information for
police administrators who are concerned about improving policies,
directing supervision, and implementing training.
23 E. FENNESSY, supra note 12, at 149-56.
24 California Highway Patrol, supra note 21, at 20.
25 Id. at 22.
26 Id. at 21.
27 E. FENNESSY, supra note 12, at 149-56.
28 Id. at 9-16.
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V. THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In 1984, the Dade Association of Chiefs of Police initiated a
two-phase national study on police pursuits. The first phase in-
cluded a content analysis of pursuit policies from around the coun-
try. All police departments in Dade County adopted a model
pursuit policy as a result of this inquiry. The second phase of the
study consisted of an empirical analysis of pursuits in Dade County.
A form was created to collect specific information on every pursuit.
The Director of the Metro-Dade Police Department volunteered his
agency as the first to participate in the study and reaffirmed the re-
quirements that the officers complete a form each time they were
involved in a pursuit and that the form be reviewed by supervisors.
The interest in pursuit by the Dade Association of Chiefs of Po-
lice removed a significant hurdle to research-the availability of
data. Based upon the theoretical issues raised in the criminology
and legal literature and the form used by the California Highway
Patrol, a new instrument was created to collect specific information
about the environment, area of the pursuit, the conditions that
prompted the chase, the in-chase tactics, and the termination of the
pursuit. As the data collection progressed, more information to the
reporting form as well as the requirement of a detailed narrative
were added. While the most recent data are the most comprehen-
sive, information on all pursuits has been verified and a 10% sample
was re-checked. Information was also collected on the officers and
the law violators, although data on the law violators were available
only for suspects who were apprehended or identified. The data
presented below represent information on pursuits from the Metro-
Dade Police Department (MDPD) for the calendar year 1987.
A. FINDINGS
This study first examines some statistics describing the popula-
tion of pursuits and then progresses to a multivariable analysis of
the pursuits to decipher relationships between the outcome of the
pursuits and various officer and situational characteristics.
As indicated by the figures in Table 1, 323 pursuits were initi-
ated in 1987 by MDPD, which comprise the population analyzed in
the present study. The vast majority of the pursuits (73%) lasted
five minutes or less. Fifty-four percent (176) of the pursuits were
initiated for traffic violations, while another 28% (92) were felony
stops or initiated because there was suspicion that the offender was
a felon. All but two of the remaining pursuits (16%) were initiated
1989]
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TABLE 1
OvERvIEw OF POLiCE PURSUITS
Number of Pursuits 323
Duration of Pursuits (minutes): <3 3-5 6-9 10+
84 12 49 38
Reason for Pursuit:
Traffic BOLO Felony Stops/Suspected Felons Reckless/DUI
176 53 92 2
Pursuits Ending in Arrests 236
Pursuits Resulting in Defendant's Death 3




Voluntarily Terminated By Officer or Supervisor 11*
* This figure does not include when the police are out-run.
because of memoranda and calls instructing the officers to "be on
the lookout for" (BOLO) a specific offender.
Two hundred and thirty-six pursuits (73%) ended in arrests
and three ended in the defendant's death. The remaining 84 (26%)
ended with the defendant escaping from the officer. One hundred
and ten (34%) of the pursuits resulted in an accident, 75 (23%) in-
cluded injuries, and 144 (45%) involved property damage. Seventy-
seven percent of the chases resulted in no personal injury. An analy-
sis of these few personal injuries indicates that in twenty-three
chases a police officer was injured, and in five chases a bystander
was injured.29 These numbers are fewer than anticipated, but they
represent serious concerns for law enforcement which must be ad-
dressed and resolved. The remaining forty-seven injuries were to
the defendants or their passengers. Nearly one-third of these inju-
ries occurred after the chase terminated and while the officer was
attempting to make an arrest. The severity of the injury in the vast
majority of cases (87%) was not serious, involving only minor
scratches, cuts, and bruises. Seven percent of the injuries were seri-
ous, an additional 1.4% were life-threatening, and less than 1% re-
sulted in death. The three deaths included a shooting and two
drownings. In one pursuit, the offender used his vehicle as a
29 Thirty-four pursuit incidents included property damage that resulted from the ap-
prehension of the suspect after the termination of the chase.
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weapon and attempted to run over a police officer, but was shot by
another officer from a neighboring jurisdiction. One of the drown-
ings involved a suspect who exited his vehicle and jumped into a
canal. The other drowning involved a suspect who ran off the road
into a canal.
B. MEASURING THE OUTCOME OF PURSUITS
The next step in the analysis-is to determine which characteris-
tics of pursuits, and of the officers, predict specific types of outcome.
For purposes of this analysis, several measures of negative outcome
have been created. These measures include whether there was an
accident, whether there was an injury to the suspect, the officer, or
bystanders, and whether the suspect escaped. Since nearly all of the
property damage resulted from accidents, the results of the analyses
on property damage are not reported separately. As the measures
of pursuit driving were all derived from the theoretical issues which
have been discussed in the literature, this study looks at which of-
ficer and pursuit characteristics predict each type of negative out-
come using discriminant analysis and then explains how the
characteristics are related to the outcome.
C. ACCIDENTS
The findings from the first discriminant analysis, on the acci-
dent/no accident measure, are summarized in Table 2. In this anal-
ysis, seven variables contributed significantly to the prediction of
accidents: officer's age, reason for pursuit, road conditions, officer's
gender, the officer's ethnicity, time of day, and type of road. This
discriminant analysis is significant at the .08 level and has a canoni-
cal correlation of .21. While the predictive strength of the factors is
not great, it resulted in the correct classification of 59% of the cases.
Because the discriminant analysis has helped identify the significant
predictors, a closer look at the effect of each of these variables on
the outcome is necessary.
A comparison of the means and breakdowns of group percent-
ages indicates that it is the pursuits initiated by officers forty years of
age and over that are the least likely to end in accidents (23%), com-
pared to 36% for the pursuits initiated by officers in their twenties,
and 35% initiated by officers in their thirties. There was a slightly
greater likelihood of an accident if the pursuit was initiated for traf-
fic reasons (36%) compared to pursuits initiated for other reasons
(32%). Pursuits conducted on wet roadways had a greater
probability of accidents (43%) than those conducted on dry road-
1989] 529
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TABLE 2
DIsmuiuNANrT ANALYsIS OF ACcDENT/NO ACCIDENT
Discriminating Variable Summary
Standardized Means
Measures Coefficients No Accident Accident F*
Officer's Age .608 31.52 30.02 .989
Reason for Pursuit .528 0.49 0.41 .974
Road Conditions .420 0.93 0.87 .981
Officer's Gender -. 364 0.91 0.93 .961
Anglo Officer -. 357 0.60 0.64 .966
Daytime - .345 0.26 0.30 .970
Pursuit on Expressway .301 0.15 0.11 .957
Results From Function Test




No Accident 213 0.153
Accident 110 -0.289
Percentage of Cases Correctly Classified: 59%
No Accident/Accident
126 (59%) 87 (41%)
46 (42%) 64 (58%)
* All F values represent transformations of Wilke's lambdas
** P = .08 or less
ways (33%). Female officers in pursuit were less likely to get into an
accident (28%) than male officers (34%). This relationship is based
on only twenty-five chases by females and should be interpreted
with caution. There is very little difference between the chances of
accidents when Anglo officers engage in pursuits (35%) compared
to the pursuits of non-Anglo officers (33%). Chases conducted dur-
ing daylight hours result in more accidents (38%) than other chases
(33%). Chases on freeways are less likely than other pursuits to end
in an accident (29% compared to 35%).
D. PERSONAL INJURY
The next category of negative outcome is personal injury. The
discriminant analysis (see Table 3) identified six variables which
contribute significantly to the prediction of personal injury: of-
ficer's age, the involvement of other police departments in the
chase, elapsed time, number of police units, the officer's gender,
and the location of the chase in a rural area. The discriminant anal-
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TABLE 3
















lice Cars .456 0.63
er -. 331 0.90
.283 0.06
Results From Function Test























145 (59%) 103 (42%)
31 (41%) 44 (59%)
59%
* All F values represent transformations of Wilke's lambdas
** P = .07 or less
ysis is significant at the .03 level and the canonical correlation is .22.
This discriminant analysis classified 59%o of the cases correctly into
the injury/no injury categories.
An in-depth analysis of each of these predictors reveals several
details. The younger the officer, the greater the likelihood that
there will be personal injury as a result of the chase. Twenty-six
percent of the chases with officers in their twenties result in personal
injury. Compare this to the 20%6 of chases with officers in their thir-
ties that result in injuries and the 18% of the chases initiated by
officers in their forties that result in injuries. Chases in which other
police agencies are involved result in a greater percentage of inju-
ries than chases that do not have help from other police depart-
ments. Twenty-one percent of the chases conducted by MDPD
officers involved injuries, while 33% of the chases involving other
police led to injuries.
Surprisingly, there is no clear relationship, between time
elapsed and injury. However, the chases that lasted between one
and three minutes and those lasting between four and five minutes
1989]
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all have slightly more than a 20% chance of concluding with inju-
ries. In comparison, 37% of the chases lasting six to nine minutes
had personal injuries. However, the extended chases, lasting ten
minutes or more, have a very low rate of personal injury (11%).
Many of the suspects involved in such long chases will likely escape
injury. It is important to remember that only 13% of the injuries
were serious or life-threatening, and one-third occurred after the
pursuit ended.
The chases with only one police car involved have a smaller
likelihood of personal injuries (20%) than chases involving two or
more police cars (28%). Chases initiated by female officers have
only half the chance of personal injury as those initiated by men.
Twelve percent of the chases by women involve personal injury
compared to 24% of the chases by men. Chases taking place in ru-
ral areas are much less likely to result in personal injuries than pur-
suits in other areas: 24% of the chases in urban or suburban areas
result in personal injuries while only 11% of chases in rural areas
involve personal injuries.
TABLE 4
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF ESCAPE/NO ESCAPE
Discriminating Variable Summary
Standardized Means
Measures Coefficients Escape No Escape F*
Number of Units .592 0.71 0.58 .987
Vehicle Type .543 0.11 0.06 .979
Chase at Night .565 0.63 0.56 .969
Top Speed -. 477 59.06 61.97 .965
Results From Function Test
U = .97 X2 =9.47 d.f. = 4 P < .05 Ran = .18
Classification Results
Predicted Group Memberships
N Centroids Escape No Escape
Escape 84 0.318 50 (60%) 34 (41%)
No Escape 239 -0.104 87 (36%) 152 (64%)
Percentage of Cases Correctly Classified: 63%
* All F values represent transformations of Wilke's lambdas
** P = .06 or less
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E. APPREHENSION V ESCAPE
The data in Table 4 summarize the results of the discriminant
analysis on suspects escaping from the pursuing officer. There are
four variables that contribute significantly to the prediction of ap-
prehension: number of police units involved in the chase, type of
vehicle being chased (which is categorized into motorcycles and
other vehicles), time of day, and top speed reached during the
chase. This analysis is significant at the .05 level and has a canonical
correlation of .18. While the strength of the factors is weak, it re-
sults in 63% percent of the chases being classified correctly into the
two groups (escape and no escape).
A closer examination of these relationships reveals that chases
employing more than one police vehicle have significantly fewer es-
capes (18%) than chases involving only one police vehicle (31%).
Nearly twice the percentage of escapes occur when the pursued ve-
hicle is a motorcycle rather than when it is an automobile or truck.
Twenty-four percent of the automobiles escape, while 44% of the
motorcycles escape. There is only a slight difference in the percent-
age of escapes between chases conducted at night and those con-
ducted at other times. Twenty-eight percent of the chases result in
escapes when conducted at night, compared to 24% of the chases at
other times. Surprisingly, chases with top speeds of forty miles per
hour and under have the greatest likelihood of escape (33%) when
compared with chases reaching top speeds of more than forty miles
per hour. The chases at lower speeds are likely to take place in resi-
dential and business areas where it is easier to escape apprehension.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. PURSUITS IN PERSPECTIVE
An analysis of possible solutions to problems involving police
strategies and tactics, in the absence of adequate research data,
often leads to faulty conclusions. This certainly has been the case
with previous attempts to respond to the problems of police pursuit.
For example, Stone and DeLuca accurately summarized the con-
ventional wisdom concerning police pursuits:
One of the major areas of controversy in traffic law enforcement, and
in patrol administration generally, is the practice of pursuing fugitives
at high speed .... High-speed pursuit is an exceedingly dangerous
kind of police operation. It is dangerous not only for the police officer
and the fugitive, but equally so for innocent citizens who happen to be
in their path.... More often than not, a high-speed pursuit ends only
when either the fugitive or the officer is involved in a collision, often a
1989]
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fatal one.
30
This description of pursuit and its inherent dangers suggests
that such activities are exceedingly dangerous for the police officer,
offender, and innocent bystander. Further, it emphasizes that a col-
lision resulting in serious injury or death is the likely result of a
high-speed pursuit. Many of these previously held beliefs about po-
lice pursuit are inconsistent with the data reported herein concern-
ing pursuits in urban areas or on freeways as reported by the
California Highway Patrol,3 ' thus providing an example of the unre-
liability of conventional wisdom.
The data from this study reveal that MDPD police officers are
involved in fewer than one pursuit per day. The MDPD mobilizes
approximately 1,000 police cars, that travel approximately 19.5 mil-
lion miles per year. A greater frequency of pursuits was expected
relative to the expectations derived from the social concern over po-
lice pursuits and the media attention given the subject.
In no way, however, can these findings be interpreted to mean
that pursuit driving is safe or should be left uncontrolled. Even in a
department that emphasizes adherence to strong policy, and that in-
cludes active control and supervision, pursuits result in some dam-
age and injury. For example, pursuit driving accounted for
approximately .08% (323 x 5) of the 19.5 million miles driven by
police during 1987. Further, there were 110 accidents, a figure
which was less than 5% of all accidents involving police cars. Thus,
the pursuit accident rate per 1,000 miles equals 68.11 (110 acci-
dents per 1,615 miles) while the non-pursuit driving, (which in-
cluded approximately 2,000 accidents for 19,500,000 miles) equals
1.03. These figures indicate that pursuit driving is sixty-five times
more likely to result in an accident than other police driving, and
that a pursuit-related accident occurred almost every three days.
3 2
However, if these same figures were computed for the seven serious
injuries, the differences would be drastically reduced.35 Determin-
ing how much is too much requires a subjective judgment not easily
established.3 4
30 A. STONE & S. DELuCA, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 414-16 (1985).
31 California Highway Patrol, supra note 20, at 22-81.
32 Critics of pursuit driving often use this type of comparison to justify policies that
restrict officers from chasing law violators. Perhaps a more appropriate comparison is
the pursuit related injury to injuries suffered as a result of other arrests.
33 Unfortunately, the figure for serious injuries is not available department wide.
However, 12% of all non-pursuit related accidents (602) resulted in an injury and Dade
County Office of Risk Management estimates that there were 11 non-pursuit accidents
that resulted in serious injuries.
34 This quantity must be established by policy-makers not researchers.
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Not only are there fewer pursuits than expected, but the vast
majority of the pursuits under study were of short duration and in-
volved relatively slow speeds. Certainly, most did not conform to
the frightening image portrayed by textbooks, Hollywood, and
other media. More than two-thirds of the pursuits lasted five min-
utes or less, and 27% ran for less than three minutes. Top speed
for nearly half of the pursuits never reached fifty-five miles per hour.
B. THE OUTCOMES: ACCIDENT, INJURY, AND APPREHENSION
Fifty-five percent of the pursuits had outcomes which did not
result in serious injury, property damage, or even a traffic accident.
The risk of pursuit driving is best understood when evaluated in a
broader perspective. For example, less than 1% of the total traffic
accidents that occurred in the county for the time period studied
involved pursuit driving. In fact, pursuit driving, the most danger-
ous type of driving in which a police officer engages, accounts for
less than 5% of all the accidents involving police cars. Moreover, a
serious injury as a result of pursuit is a rare event. This is especially
true for the police officer or innocent bystander. The majority of
the chases in he studied population resulted in no property dam-
age. It is obvious that while these findings do not support the com-
monly held view that most chases in Dade County result in
accidents, serious injury, or property damage, they reflect a serious
concern for law enforcement.
Finally, the level of risk involved in these pursuits must be bal-
anced against the deterrent effect of criminal apprehension. On the
one hand, it has been demonstrated that the cost component of the
cost/benefit ratio is serious, but much less than commonly thought.
On the other hand, the benefit of initiating pursuits is that, contrary
to conventional thought, nearly three-fourths result in an arrest.
While a majority of the pursuits were initiated for relatively minor
traffic infractions, many of those apprehended were charged with
serious felony offenses unrelated to the pursuit (nearly 50%). This
indicates that many offenders flee from the officer because of con-
cern over more than the traffic offense that initiated the pursuit.
These findings might not be generalized to all or even most po-
lice departments. As stated earlier, the Dade Association of Chiefs
of Police conducted a content analysis of pursuit policies from
around the country. This analysis resulted in a model policy
adopted by the MDPD from which these data were collected. A rea-
sonable explanation for the findings in this study is the strong policy
of the MDPD-its requirement for strict supervision and officer ac-
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countability through mandatory reporting and review of pursuits.
One important implication of this explanation is that pursuit-related
problems-can be minimized with the adoption of a strong pursuit
policy, which includes distinct controls and accountability, coupled
with effective police officer training.
C. CONTROLLABLE FACTORS
It is imperative to remember that the outcome of a pursuit is
determined by a combination of factors. The preceding discussion
of these factors is incomplete without the recognition of at least
three actors in the pursuit scenario. These actors include the police
officer, the law violator, and any third party who happens to become
involved by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Little or no
control can be had over the offender and any bystanders. As a re-
sult, the explained variance is weak. However, there are some fac-
tors that can be controlled. Patterns emerged that can both direct
policy and training and provide a foundation for future research.
The summary of findings presented in Table 5 indicates the signifi-
cant predictors of pursuit outcome.
TABLE 5
SIGNIFICANT PREDICTORS OF PuRSuIT OUTCOME









Time of Day X X
Vehicle Type X
Reason for Pursuit X




The officer's age was a significant predictor of negative out-
come for accident and injury. In each case, the younger officers had
the greatest likelihood of negative outcome as a result of their
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chases. In spite of their greater propensity for negative outcomes,
younger officers were not more likely to apprehend their suspects.
The younger officers conducted less efficient chases with respect to
the cost/benefit ratio than older officers. Older officers tend to be
less willing to take the same risks that they took when they were
younger. The following quotes illustrate these differences:
When I was younger I would have been more concerned about busting
my ass to catch some creep who was trying to escape. Now, I figure this
creep will get himself in enough trouble and someone will bust his
head. I wasn't going to put my ass on-the-line for that creep. He was
smart he just quit.35
It was a game, man he was trying to get away and I wasn't going to let
him. Thinking about it now, I probably shouldn't have been so con-
cerned with getting the guy, who cares, you know? But at the time it
was all that mattered. And I got the son-of-a-bitch.
3 6
The officers' gender was another significant factor in predicting
accident and injury. The male officers had the highest probability of
a chase resulting in a negative outcome. Similar to the age factor,
the increase in the intensity of the pursuits conducted by males did
not yield a greater benefit in terms of apprehension. The gender of
the officer was not a significant factor in the probability of the sus-
pect escaping. Thus, pursuits conducted by females were more effi-
cient with respect to the cost/benefit ratio. Female officers
apparently were more concerned about the risks involved in pursuit
driving, and the following quote illustrates their ability to balance
the costs and benefits:
I have to concentrate enough while stopping someone who is cooper-
ating. I'm not going to take crazy chances driving crazy in a crowded
area with the radio blasting, driving to beat all hell after some charac-
ter who doesn't want to stop for whatever reason. I'll do my job, but
there is a limit.
3 7
It appears that the aggressiveness of the younger male officers
is a characteristic not conducive to efficient and safe pursuits. While
it is difficult to determine from our data the exact reasons for these
findings, this is an area that future research should examine more
comprehensively.
In addition to several characteristics emerging as important
predictors across most categories of outcome, several types of out-
35 Quotation from a 48 year-old male patrol officer who had been in a pursuit the day
before (May 13, 1988).
36 Quotation from a 24 year-old male patrol officer who had been in a pursuit earlier
that day (April 5, 1988).
37 Quotation from a 35 year-old female officer who had been in a pursuit the day
before (April 19, 1988).
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come had unique variables that help explain the probability of that
outcome. For example, a unique set of variables explains the
probability of an accident. Accidents are more likely when the roads
are wet, when the pursuit takes place during heavy traffic in the day
than during light traffic at night, and when the pursuit takes place
on roads other than expressways. These factors indicate that road
conditions and the extent of traffic influence the likelihood of acci-
dents, but not the likelihood of escape or injury which are influ-
enced by another set of variables. Injuries are most likely when
chases take place in urban areas, involve more than one police unit
or police from another jurisdiction, and are of fairly long duration
(six to nine minutes). Since most injuries occur after the chase when
the officer arrests the suspect, it appears that chases which come to
involve complicating circumstances, such as more than one officer
or long duration, allow the situation to become more heated and
result in more injuries. Escapes are more likely when the pursuits
are conducted at night and when the suspect is riding a motorcycle.
They are less likely when more than one police unit gets involved
and, surprisingly, they are more likely for the slower chases. Appar-
ently, the higher-speed chases take place on freeways where it is
more difficult to out-run the police. This unique set of factors is
important in that it influences the escape of the suspect, but it does
not have much effect on accidents or injury.
D. ALEATORY FACTORS
While there is limited influence on one of the actors involved in
the pursuit interaction, the actions of the other two actors-the of-
fender and bystander-depend upon aleatory factors that involve
uncertain contingencies. One implication of this study is to shift the
focus from the officers' characteristics and policy directives to the
mechanisms that explain the interaction between the officer, the law
violator's behavior, and the bystander's actions. These interactions
give the pursuit outcome much of its ad hoc character. An impor-
tant result of this conclusion should be an increased consciousness
of the role that uncertain contingencies play in the final outcome of
pursuit driving.
These processes are similar to those found by Short and
Strodtbeck38 which contribute to illegitimate paternity, violent be-
havior, and gang delinquency. Their analysis acknowledged the
weaknesses of studying the differences among the actors or in-
38 J. SHORT & F. STRODTBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG DELINQUENCY 265-71
(1965).
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dependent macro-level factors and focused on the process.39 Their
aleatory notion stressed the independence of factors involved in a
situation and focused on the probability of these events occurring
together. Analogously, it is insufficient merely to be a good police
officer and take normal precautions. Pursuits are not undertaken
with the expectation that an accident will occur, but increasing the
exposure to risk Will increase that likelihood.
Even though an officer may conduct the "perfect" chase by fol-
lowing all policy directives and by making all the right decisions, the
chase may result in the worst possible outcome due to some unfor-
seen contingency. For example, a pedestrian may not hear the po-
lice siren and step in front of a law violator or speeding police car.
As a result, a well conducted chase ends in the worst possible out-
come-the death of an innocent bystander. Unforeseen contingen-
cies make any chase a risk, although significantly less than that
suggested by conventional wisdom.
Pursuit is one tactic available to police in their war against
crime. Because it is potentially dangerous, pursuit driving must be
careful and consistent with the police mission-to protect lives. As
we move into the 1990s, many police strategies are being modified
with strong guidance from empirical research. No longer can deci-
sions be made without appropriate research, analysis, and planning.
Perhaps findings from empirical research will influence police pur-
suit policy, training, supervision and accountability.
39 Id. at 248.
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